

Building Democracy in the Classrooms: Case Studies in Cordoba, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay

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Abstract: How do societies teach their citizens to build and foster democratic cultures? Many researchers look to major political agents such as the educational system, where adolescents shape the political attitudes they carry with them into adulthood. In the last few decades the Ehman's classroom climate (1969, 1980), in which "students are encouraged to investigate and express diverse views on social issues," (Hahn 1999: 232) has proven a significant factor in the development of democratic norms and behavior. While a substantial amount of research on the classroom climate has been done in the United States and Europe, little has been done in Latin America, where many governments have recently transitioned from dictatorships to democracies in the last two decades. Argentina and Uruguay are two countries within Latin America that share almost identical social identities and transitions from dictatorships to democracies during the 1980's and significantly different measures of democratic support today. This study used surveys that replicated Ehman's classroom climate scale in Cordoba, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay during June, July, and August of 2007. Findings show that the classroom climate indicators are significantly related to attitudes of political trust, political confidence, political interest, and social integration.

I. Introduction

Latin America is a region historically bestowed with a volatile political reality fluctuating between democratic, authoritarian, and socialist regimes. A traveler in this area might learn to casually identify national revolutionaries echoing progressive Latino transitions: Bolivar, Amaru, Artigas, Che, Sandino, etc. In passing, he may also recognize clues of a not-so-distant, dark past: Pinochet, the Dirty War, Shining Path, etc. A student and volunteer, however, who shares a local language, family, and education in Latin America understands these social and political complexities much deeper. This research is likewise inspired by an undergraduate year of study abroad in Peru and Costa Rica. Like almost every national comparison in the region, these countries experience a common latino culture and yet very different social, economic, and political realities. It was quite apparent by the time I left Latin America that democracy was more than a government; it was a social regime whose norms were followed by some nations more than others. This study explores how the education system promotes democracy in two reputedly 'European' countries in the Southern Cone of South America: Argentina and Uruguay. It expands on the existing literature that links civic education to democratic cultures by measuring the extent of the classroom climate in each country.

II. The Classroom Climate

In the third wave of democratization, many Latin American countries in the past twenty five years have undertaken the process of transitioning from authoritarian to democratic regimes and consolidating their democracies. To do so, these governments have been faced with the task of resocializing their political cultures to accept democracy,

or to teach their citizens political behaviors that “contribute to the stability or maintenance of a political system.”(Langton 1969) Education has historically been used as a mechanism for governments to conduct this resocialization, as it instills political behaviors of trust, integration, confidence, and interest into pupils who will eventually participate in the general society. However, *how* schools socialize their students to accept democracy is the question researchers have asked for the last three decades in the United States, and more recently in an international scope. Ehman’s (1980: 253) “classroom climate,” or the atmosphere where “students are encouraged to investigate and express diverse views on social issues” (Hahn 1999: 232) has been highlighted as a significant factor in the development of democratic norms and behavior. In applying the research of Ehman’s classroom climate scale to secondary schools in Buenos Aires and Montevideo, I tested his hypothesis that “openness of social studies classroom climate is related to change in social and political attitudes towards school and to change in general social and political attitudes” (Ehman 1980: 253) in Argentina and Uruguay.

The topic of political socialization, or the process where social institutions instill political attitudes in the young, was first published in by Herbert Hyman (1959). Since then, academics have researched for decades how these agents, such as the family, media, government, and education system, promote democracy to a nation’s youth (Dudley and Gitelson 2003). Thus, researchers have confirmed that civic education develops student political attitudes that support a democratic culture. As an institution, the education system becomes a medium where students learn what a democracy is and the formative processes that are necessary precursors to democracy (Torney-Purta 2002). These studies were originally conducted in the United States and Western Europe. With the fall of the

Soviet Union and the emergence of transitioning democracies across the globe, the study of civic education in promoting democracy became once again a hot topic during the onset of the 1990s (Dudley and Gitelson 2003). Today, international research institutions explicitly study this topic in countries all over the world, such as International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), Educational Testing Services (ETS), National Alliance for Civic Education (NACE), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

When studying the education system, researchers can examine macro issues, such as education reform, curriculum, and textbook content. However, another important component in this field is the classroom climate, which measures the daily interactions between teachers and students. In this setting, students learn about democracy by participating in open dialogue based on inquiry. This is an important formative process. In a pivotal 1980 study (modeled after his 1969 study that introduced the concept), Ehman's classroom climate is measured by three indicators: 1) controversial issues exposure, 2) range of viewpoints, and 3) openness of student expression. The first indicator, controversial issues exposure, measures how often students believe contentious topics, such as racism or politics, are presented to the classroom. Range of viewpoints, the second indicator, measures how often students feel all aspects of any given controversial issue are discussed. The third indicator, openness of student expression, measures how often students feel free to voice their opinions about these controversial issues.

Ehman's three year longitudinal study in 1980 concluded that a higher presence of the three classroom climate indicators corresponds to higher levels of four political

attitudes: 1) political trust, 2) political confidence, 3) political interest, and 4) social integration (Ehman 1980: 264). Researchers have confirmed these attitudes as precursors to adult political participation (Easton and Denis 1969, Hahn 1999). Other studies have demonstrated that educational settings modeled after inquiry and open discussions, where students learn to become more active and involved through democratic dialogue, produce stronger political attitudes supportive of democracy (Long and Long 1975, Blankenship 1990). Furthermore, it has been shown that regular classroom discussions that promote student expression, also measured by the classroom climate, “are positively correlated with political knowledge and interest and negatively correlated with authoritarian attitudes” (Torney et al 1975 in Hahn 1999:233). The study of Classroom Climate in the education system could shed light as to why some countries are more accepting of democracy than others. It could also strengthen existing research in regions of the world, like Latin America.

International research of civic education and participatory democracy are recently integrating Latin American case studies. There are several reasons for the inclusion of this region, which includes Mexico, Central America, and all the countries of South America and the Caribbean that speak Latin languages (Spanish, Portuguese, and French). First, between the mid 1970s and late 1990s, fifteen countries in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean underwent dictatorships. By the end of the 1990s, these nations transitioned into democratic regimes in what is commonly referred to as the ‘third wave of democratization.’ Studies of civic education, then, provide insight as to how these countries build and maintain their democratic cultures today and in the future. Second, almost 40% of the total regional population is under eighteen years

of age (Torney-Purta and Amadeo 2004). Latino governments and schools are moreover faced with the daunting task of socializing a significantly large youth population to support democracy, deeming civic education a pressing issue in the region. Third, Latin America is a geographical area that shares overarching cultural norms and practices and stark regional differences. Language, religion, and the societal influences of these two institutions unify the region. At the same time, nationalism, political strife, and economic disparity create different realities between countries and areas of Latin America. Civic education therefore has different impacts and limits in these different regional contexts. So far, qualitative and quantitative studies of civic education have been conducted in countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Columbia (Torney-Purta et al 2001, Torney-Purta, Hahn, and Amadeo 2001, Torney Purta and Amadeo 2004, Levinson and Stevick 2006). Further research is needed on this topic in other countries.

Case Study: Argentina and Uruguay

Argentina and Uruguay make an interesting case study because of the vast cultural and historical similarities and markedly different support for democracy between both countries. Both countries experience a similar homogenous social construct and high standard of living that separates them from most of the continent. With 97% White, European descent in Argentina and 92% in Uruguay, these two countries in the southern cone of South America stand apart from their neighbors (CIA World Factbook 2008, Argentina and Uruguay). Both countries also enjoy a comparable, high standard of living with GNI per capitas of \$4,220 and \$4,320 in Argentina and Uruguay respectively (Freedom House 2008). Furthermore, the two countries experience relatively high

literacy rates (97% Argentina, 98% Uruguay) for South America (CIA World Factbook 2008).

There are also many social elements that bind Argentina and Uruguay together. Historically, both countries have developed under a European influence, and this is reflected in their architecture, infrastructure, and homogeneous societies. They have similar terrain and a long history of Gaucho farming; outside large cities this traditional practice of cattle herding is very common. Argentina and Uruguay furthermore follow the same pop culture, music, and fashion. Citizens in both countries speak with a dialectical Spanish that is very distinct and renowned throughout Latin America. Not surprisingly, they both have similar national flags and heroes. On a very micro level comparison, Argentina and Uruguay share other national similarities, such as their revered national sandwiches and even pride for consuming large amounts of mate and traditional barbequing. In all, there are several cultural links that legitimize a comparative study within and between the two countries.

Argentina and Uruguay also experienced authoritarian regimes and transitioned to democracy within the same timeframe. These dictatorships had a significant impact on the general society and education system in both countries. The repressive dictatorship in Argentina lasted from 1976 to 1983. With the abrupt takeover of the military junta in 1976, massive campaigns were implemented to wipe out leftist dissidents and their organizations. Today human rights groups hold that 9,000 people have disappeared and up to 30,000 people have died within this period (CNN 2008). To instill a norm of fear and obedience amongst the people, the military disbanded the press and peoples of free speech and other civil liberties, denied political parties and elections, and continued to

terrorize individuals believed to be unsupportive of the regime. All of these efforts created an atmosphere of self-censorship amongst the public.

Self-censorship was also evident amongst teachers and pupils within the education system. The military immediately took over and resumed control of the Ministry of Education and all of its operations. Its first task was to purge 3,000 professors from the system, mostly from the social science department (Hanson 1996). The junta continued to draft and implement the 1980 decree No. 2620, which had the systematic goal of devaluing intellectual inquiry and scientific knowledge in order to instead promote 'traditional national ideals' (Lanza and Finocchio 1993). With the enforcement of a militarized order within public and private schools, the regime managed to uphold authoritarian norms within the education system as well. As indoctrinated students followed a strict dress code, methods to carry books and arrive to classes, and language to address the classroom, self censorship was indeed manifested amongst faculty and students.

The simultaneous dictatorship in Uruguay also inculcated self censorship within its general society and education system. The Uruguayan dictatorship, coordinated with those in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru under Operation Condor, reigned from 1973 to 1985. The dictatorship in Uruguay was not as violent as the one in Argentina: there are only 200 officially recorded killings amongst a population of three million. However, with a consistent one in thirty adults imprisoned at any given time, Uruguay held the world's highest detainees per capita- and utilized draconian methods of torture on many of them (Sondrol 1992). Similar to Argentina, the military junta in Uruguay instituted a *Doctrino de Seguridad Nacional* (National Security

Doctrine) that legitimized the banning of over 30 newspapers, all political parties, elections, and other civil liberties. Over 500,000 citizens fled Uruguay, leaving those who remained invasively watched over by the regime (Filguiera 2004).

Like Argentina, the Uruguayan military regime furthermore instituted self censorship in the education system for both teachers and students. After seizing the *Consejo Nacional de Education* (Ministry of Education), the military junta drafted Law No. 14.101, which gave it unchecked executive control over public schools. It also added Orden 14, which expanded the regime's control to private schools as well (Mieres 2004). Under this 'legal' framework, the military junta then introduced Plan 63; much like Argentina's decree No. 2620, Plan 63 restricted plurality of opinions, relativism, and cultural pluralism within the classroom (Filguiera 2004). Students and teachers were strictly monitored. Students were required to follow specific dress codes and classroom rules that denied individual expression and promoted outing 'communist' or 'subversive' classmates. Teachers were labeled under the national ABC program, with each letter denoting the level of faith to the regime. Teachers were moreover required under Decree 28 to prove they were never part of a dissident organization (Sondrol 1992). All of these laws created an environment of fear within the education system that lent to self censorship.

Coming out of these dictatorships, the education system in both countries had to reorganize its objectives, personnel, and actions. In the 1990s both countries, as part of a wider movement in the Southern Cone of South America, underwent education reform. Argentina chose a path of progressive, decentralized programs while Uruguay opted for a more centralized, traditional plan (Bentancur 2004, de Giori 2004). Both courses of wider

educational reform have been well documented. The classroom climate, which was universally characterized by a self-censorship, was not. Today both countries are working to consolidate their democracies, yet they hold markedly different levels of support for the regime. A 2005 poll by Latinbarometer shows that when asked about whether they would support democracy over any other regime, 66% of Uruguayans answered yes opposed to a mere 33% in Argentina (Latinobarometro 2005). Since existing literature shows that the classroom climate can bolster norms necessary to democracy, an investigation of the classroom climate in both countries could certainly measure how effective the education system is in promoting democracy in two countries where it was previously an agent that socialized terror and fear into its pupils.

III. Methods

The data from this research came from 439 surveys administered to high school seniors in Cordoba, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay in June, July, and August of 2007. The surveys were administered in four schools in Cordoba and five schools in Montevideo. These sites, composing a convenience sample, were selected for their similar urban structure and reputations as national education centers. Cordoba has a population of roughly 1.4 million and is considered the university capital of Argentina. The colonial city is home to the oldest university in Argentina and likewise has maintained itself as the arts and learning center of the nation. As home to half the population in Uruguay, Montevideo boasts 1.3 million people and the title as the modern, industrialized part of the country. Uruguay has the oldest and most developed education systems in the western hemisphere, mostly launched from its capital.

The sample is fairly representative of all socio-economic neighborhoods within the two cities. SES was measured by parental educational attainment, and there were some discrepancies between the two countries. Table I illustrates that in Cordoba, mother and father high school incomplete and less were 35.4% and 42.3% respectively. Completed bachelors or higher were 33.5% and 31.3%. Of the Montevideo samples, high school incompleteness or less statistics for mothers and fathers are 12.6% and 20.4% respectively. Completed bachelors or higher statistics were 53.7% and 51.6%. The higher educational attainment levels of parents in Montevideo reflect the idea that Uruguay has historically had a developed education system and a social democracy that promotes such a system. There is also a discrepancy in sex between the two project sites. In Cordoba, 68% of students were female, whereas in Montevideo 57% were female. This is because one school in the Argentine case study was a private, all girls school.

In total, students were surveyed in two public schools and seven private, catholic schools. The overrepresentation of private catholic schools is due to several factors. First, collaboration with private schools was much more achievable than public schools in both countries because of bureaucratic restrictions. In Argentina, the education system is exceptionally decentralized and in Uruguay exceptionally centralized, and these extremes limited legal access to public schools. Hence it was not possible to include more than one public school in Argentina and one in Uruguay. Second, within Latin America in general and these two countries specifically, there exists a strong presence of Catholicism. The religion is deeply rooted in many aspects of the society and its institutions, including education. This is demonstrated through the large number of

catholic as compared to public schools within the two countries. Third, there exists a high number of private schools in both locations. There are significant educational inequities between public and private schools in Argentina and Uruguay. It is widely believed that public schools are generally inferior to private schools, and communities of all socioeconomic levels support private schools as alternatives to public education.

(INSERT TABLE 1)

The surveys replicated Ehman's 1980 study and therefore included questions measuring the three components of the classroom climate as well as attitudes of political trust, political confidence, political participation, and social integration (Ehman 1980: pg 256). The classroom climate scale is broken into three components: controversial issues exposure, range of viewpoints, and openness of student expression. The questions pertaining to political confidence, political participation, and social integration were further presented to students with reference to their school environment and the society at large. Political trust was categorized into questions about the general society, school atmosphere, and teacher authority. All questions were ordinal and scaled: always, almost always, sometimes, rarely, and never. There was a combination of negatively and positively worded questions on the survey. Questions on the survey were taken from the 1980 classroom climate study by Ehman and translated into Spanish. The surveys each had twenty questions pertaining to the three classroom climate indicators and the four political attitudes.

IV. Results and Discussion

Data was analyzed using an Analysis of Covariance. Questions of political attitudes were first grouped into a scale and correlated with a two-tailed Pearson's correlation. All the political attitude scales (political confidence, political trust, political interest, and social integration) are significantly correlated. In the ANCOVA analysis, gender and mother/father educational attainment were controlled for. Because the two countries have such a homogenous society, race was not included in the analysis. Significant relationships were measured between the independent variables (classroom climate indicators) and dependent variables (four political attitudes). These measurements were analyzed for the dependent variable in total, within each country, and between each country.

There are significant relationships between the classroom indicators and the political attitude scales. Table II below shows that the first indicator, controversial issues exposure, is only significantly related to political confidence ($P=.001$). However, in Table III the second indicator, range of viewpoints, has a statistically significant relationship with political trust ($P=.000$), political confidence ($P=.006$), and political interest ($P=.034$). Most impressive, the openness of student expression indicator in Table IV has a significant relationship with political trust ($P=.000$), social integration ($P=.019$), political confidence ($P=.001$), and political interest ($P=.015$). That range of viewpoints is significantly related to three of the four political attitude scales and openness of student expression is related to all four political attitudes is an important finding.

(INSERT TABLE II)

(INSERT TABLE III)

(INSERT TABLE IV)

Given the social and political history of the two countries, it is interesting that the order from least to greatest significant relationships between the classroom climate indicators is: controversial issues exposure, range of viewpoints, openness of student expression. During each respective dictatorship, controversial issues were inevitably presented to the classroom as hypersensitive topics like national loyalty, subversion, and ‘disappearances’ seized the lives of teachers and students. However, under the various ad-hoc educational laws during the time of their authoritarian regimes, all sides of these issues were not discussed. When classroom dialogue was scripted and closely monitored, range of viewpoints were not present in the class. Furthermore, students were not allowed to voice their own opinions, especially if it went against what the regime was propagating through the education system in both Argentina and Uruguay. Thus, openness of student expression was not tolerated in either country. It is remarkable that today, when both countries are continuing the process of consolidating their democracies, the two most repressed classroom climate indicators during their dictatorships (range of viewpoints, openness of student expression) are now the most significant in promoting democratic norms amongst their students, or soon-to-be adult citizens.

When graphing both the statistically significant and insignificant relationships between the classroom climate indicators and the four political attitudes in both sites combined, there is a general linear pattern. In propositional form, these patterns are positive. For example, Table V illustrates that the more openness of student expression pupils report in the classroom, the more political confidence they report within their school environment and the general society. Of the eight significant relationships and the

four insignificant relationships between the classroom climate indicators and the political attitudes, all individual graphs show a positive, linear pattern except for two. The relationship between range of viewpoints and openness of student expression with social integration do not follow such positive graphed patterns. However, the relationship between openness of student expression and social integration is still a significant relationship.

(INSERT TABLE V)

These positive relationships between classroom climate indicators and political attitudes add to the existing literature that the open classroom climate does impact political attitudes necessary to a functioning democracy. Specifically, it gives merit to Ehman's 1980 hypothesis that "openness of social studies classroom climate is related to change in social and political attitudes towards school and to change in general social and political attitudes" (Ehman 1980: 253). On a more international level, these positive relationships suggest that the classroom climate is significant in other cultural contexts and in different types and stages of democracy than those traditionally found in the United States and Western Europe. It certainly builds on the existing quantitative and qualitative literature of the topic within Latin America.

A few of the graphed relationships of classroom climate indicators and political attitudes between countries show remarkably parallel findings. In these cases, the students in each country report similar attitudinal trends, yet at very different levels of support. These examples are: controversial issues exposure and political trust, range of viewpoints and political interest, and openness of student expression and social integration. The only insignificant relationship of these three examples is that between

controversial issues exposure and social integration. Surprisingly, students from Argentina report higher support for these political attitudes than those from Uruguay in these relationships.

(INSERT TABLE VI)

A possible explanation for the higher political attitude support of the Argentinean sample compared to the Uruguayan sample lies within the different political histories between both countries. Before her dictatorship, Argentina saw military rule in 1930-32, 1943-46, 1955-58, 1962-63, 1970-73, and 1976-1983. She also saw populist regimes and democracies. In such anarchy, Argentines have learned (except in extreme military rule) to voice their discontent, especially at the pervasive corruption that still runs rampant in many sectors of the society. This history may be responsible for the more active political attitudes that the Cordoba sample report. Uruguay, on the other hand, developed a strong social democracy very early on by President Jorge Batlle y Ordonez in the early 1900s. *Batlleismo*, or social welfare principals, have generally governed Uruguay since. Such a paternalistic government has created a sense of apathy amongst the people, who by and large believe their government will simply take care of them. It is possible that this precise national thought is reflected in the low levels of political attitudes in the Montevideo sample. Alarmingly, this same low level of political involvement led to the slow takeover of the 1973 military dictatorship. If the classroom climate is significant in these two sites, perhaps it could be utilized as a tool to overcome these social and economic impediments to consolidating democracy.

V. Conclusion

The findings of this exploratory study expand on the relevance of the classroom climate in promoting democratic norms to students in the two project sites of Cordoba, Argentina and Montevideo, Uruguay. The significant relationships between the classroom climate indicators, especially range of viewpoints and openness of student expression, with all four political attitudes warrant future studies in these two countries specifically and within Latin America in general. However, as an exploratory study that introduces existing material to a new location grounded in a special culture, there are several research limitations and suggestions for future research. These include using larger national samples and restructuring research questions to accommodate material presented by this study.

While the students in the Cordoba and Montevideo samples all live in the national context of Argentina and Uruguay, a future study should seek to achieve larger national samples, particularly in the case of Argentina. Although the students in this study are raised to be patriotic citizens of their respective country and are socialized to revere nationalism, a sample size of roughly 220 students in each site by no means represents the two countries. Indeed, 220 cases cannot represent three million Uruguayans and pales in comparison to a population of thirty million in Argentina. A future study should incorporate rural as well as urban samples, especially in the decentralized Argentinean educational system. Since this study aims to gauge how the educational system contributes to the process of consolidating democracies, a future longitudinal study would be more effective than and could build upon this cross-sectional one.

Future surveys should also create scales composed of more questions to better avoid a Type II error. One finding of this study was that students in each sample had parallel patterns of support for political attitudes, but at different levels. New questions should be included to better examine these different levels of support for political attitudes between countries. Future studies could control for national feelings of apathy (Uruguay) or frustration with corruption (Argentina) in each country. Addressing all of these limitations would greatly enhance the contribution that this study makes in highlighting the role civic education plays in forming democratic norms amongst students. This study could potentially be the foundation for future classroom climate studies within these two countries.

VI. References

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Table I

Student Demographics				
	Uruguay		Argentina	
	N	%	N	%
Gender				
Female	126	57.3	147	68.1
Male	94	42.7	69	31.9
Mother Level of Education				
Elementary or Less	6	2.8	35	16.7
High School Incomplete	21	9.8	39	18.7
High School Complete	37	17.3	43	20.6
bachelors incomplete	35	16.4	22	10.5
Bachelors Complete	92	43	44	21.1
Masters and Above	23	10.7	26	12.4
Father Level of Education				
Elementary or Less	13	6	31	14.9
High School Incomplete	31	14.4	57	27.4
High School Complete	37	17.2	29	13.9
Bachelors Incomplete	23	10.7	26	12.5
Bachelors Complete	79	36.7	42	20.2
Masters and Above	32	14.9	23	11.1
Student Perception of SES				
Upper Class	3	1.4	18	8.7
Middle-Upper Class	151	70.2	91	44.2
Middle-Lower Class	57	26.5	91	44.2
Lower Class	7	14.9	6	2.9
School Type				
Public	46	20.7	83	38.2
Private	176	79.3	134	61.8
N				
Total	222		217	

Table II

Analysis of Covariance of Controversial Issues Exposure		
<i>Political Trust Scale</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
Country	.361	.548
Controversial Issues Exposure	1.608	.172
Country* Controversial Issues Exposure	.828	.508
<i>Social Integration Scale</i>		
Country	4.308	.039*
Controversial Issues Exposure	2.084	.082
Country* Controversial Issues Exposure	.147	.964
<i>Political Confidence Scale</i>		
Country	.026	.871
Controversial Issues Exposure	4.910	.001*
Country* Controversial Issues Exposure	1.471	.210
<i>Political Interest Scale</i>		
Country	1.531	.217
Controversial Issues Exposure	2.332	.055
Country* Controversial Issues Exposure	.907	.460

Table III

Analysis of Covariance of Range of Viewpoints		
<i>Political Trust Scale</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>P</i>
Country	.323	.570
Range of Viewpoints	7.250	.000*
Country* Range of Viewpoints	1.238	.294
<i>Social Integration Scale</i>		
Country	15.098	.000*
Range of Viewpoints	.274	.895
Country* Range of Viewpoints	1.503	.200
<i>Political Confidence Scale</i>		
Country	.892	.346
Range of Viewpoints	3.664	.006*
Country* Range of Viewpoints	.487	.745
<i>Political Interest Scale</i>		
Country	1.883	.171
Range of Viewpoints	2.627	.034*
Country* Range of Viewpoints	.137	.968

Table IV

Analysis of Covariance of Openness of Student Expression		
<i>Political Trust Scale</i>		
Country	1.154	.283
Openness of Student Expression	5.994	.000*
Country* Openness of Student Expression	2.100	.080
<i>Social Integration Scale</i>		
Country	3.409	.066
Openness of Student Expression	2.985	.019*
Country* Openness of Student Expression	3.594	.007*
<i>Political Confidence Scale</i>		
Country	1.291	.257
Openness of Student Expression	4.542	.001*
Country* Openness of Student Expression	1.264	.283
<i>Political Interest Scale</i>		
Country	.708	.401
Openness of Student Expression	3.141	.015*
Country* Openness of Student Expression	2.697	.031*

Table V




Table VI