
The Rhetorical Art: A Psychology of *Phaedrus*

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And Tisias and Gorgias? How can we leave them out when it is they who realized that what is likely must be held in higher honor than what is true...[I]nsofar as there is an art of rhetoric, I don't believe the right method for acquiring it is to be found in the direction Lysias and Thrasymachus have followed (*Phaedrus* 267a, 269d).

Tisias, Gorgias, Lysias, and Thrasymachus: A classical list of Athenian masters of the rhetorical realm; but according to the Platonic tradition, a list of superficial sophists. Sophists are those orators or rhetoricians who do not practice the rhetorical art or the technical use of rhetoric. Instead, their skill relies on a “knack” for flattery. “I call it flattery, basically. I think that this practice has many other parts as well....This part *seems* to be a craft, but in my account of it it isn't a craft but a knack and a routine. I call oratory a part of this, too . . . (*Gorgias* 463b).”

In Plato's *Gorgias*, Socrates demonstrates the superior power of philosophy over mere sophistry by defeating and embarrassing the sophist Gorgias. Socrates could have just easily defeated him; but instead he chooses to embarrass him by “grandstanding” the fact that he, Socrates, has found an inconsistency in the great Gorgias' argument. Gorgias who would now bow out of the discussion, in order to save himself of the embarrassment, is cheered on by the crowd of listeners to answer to Socrates' dialectical method (*Gor.* 457e-458c). “It'll be to my shame ever after, Socrates, if I weren't willing, when I myself have made the claim that anyone may ask me anything he wants. All right, if it suits these people, carry on with the discussion, and ask what you want (*Gor.* 458d-e).” Finally, if Socrates' win was not enough to show the superiority of philosophy, we are shown it through its winning over of Gorgias. In the middle of the dialogue, there is a surprising interjection by the defeated sophist, who was once most eager to quit the dialogue but now is nearly giddy to see it continue (*Gor.* 497b). Philosophy not only has the ability to defeat sophistry but, in the end, persuades one of sophistry's major proponents to its side.

Yet I would like to ask the following questions: Is Socrates and Platonic philosophy *above* the use of sophistry? And if so, how? For despite Socrates' arguments against the practice of sophistry (because it is only a knack for

producing pleasure and gratification, as opposed to an art that seeks the good), I believe that there can be little doubt that Socrates uses his own type of rhetoric (*Gor.* 465a). Before these questions can be answered, we should first want to become clear about what the rhetorical art is. For this I will employ the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. The *Phaedrus* amounts to an initiation into the nature of rhetorical art. And I will use Plato's *Symposium* so that by divining the constitution of Phaedrus' soul (what principle and appetites lord over his soul), I can make a precursory interpretation of the whole *Phaedrus*--especially emphasizing that the *Phaedrus* is best viewed as a lesson in the use of rhetoric. Along the way we will provide contrasting examples from Gorgian sophistry of what the art of rhetoric *is not*. In summary, I hope to paint a picture of Socratic rhetoric by depicting what it is and its application, which in turn will show rhetoric to be the driving principle, as opposed to dialectics, of Platonic philosophy. That is to say that a fully conceived rhetoric, *a rhetoric of the private realm*, captures Platonic philosophy better than a *characterless* exercise in dialectics: thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Rhetoric, instead, becomes the crowning achievement rather than as Aristotle says "the antistrophe" of dialectics (*On Rhetoric* I.1.1). From this picture we shall see Socrates' own application of the rhetorical art.

The Art of Rhetoric

The basis of Socrates' attack on Gorgias' type of rhetoric is that he can give no account of what rhetoric is, what its subject-matter is, and how it is employed. Because Gorgias does not possess such an account, he can make no claim to knowledge concerning rhetoric, and without such a knowledge, he has no knowledge to impart. He is altogether ignorant about his own practice. "I don't know whether this is the kind of oratory that Gorgias practices--in fact in our discussion a while ago we didn't get at all clear on just what he thinks it is (*Gor.* 463a)." Therefore his *original* claim, that he can teach others to be orators, is refuted: "Soc: 'Aren't we to say that you're capable of making others orators too?' Gor: 'That's exactly the claim I make. Not only here, but elsewhere, too (*Gor.* 449b).'" Whatever it is that Gorgias does possess concerning rhetoric, Socrates calls it a "knack," that is to say some sort of natural inclination or talent for the kinds of speech that an audience enjoys hearing. In giving the audience what they want to hear, he flatters them. Gorgias flatters in two ways: one, he delivers only the kind of speeches an audience wants to hear, thus producing pleasure; and from giving out this kind of pleasure exclusively, thereby ignoring that which might not be pleasant and

yet still good, he implicitly acknowledges that the audience's desires are best; two, because he is not critical of his audience, he implicitly honors them. "I call this flattery, and I say that such a thing is shameful...because it guesses at what's pleasant with no consideration for what's best. And I say that it isn't a craft but a knack, because it has no account of the nature of whatever things it applies by which it applies them, so that it's unable to state the cause of each thing. And I refuse to call anything that lacks such an account a craft (*Gor.* 465a)."

Opposed to this instinctual knack for flattery, my goal is to find a rational account of rhetoric. Once having found that, I shall conclude by showing the inherent inconsistency within Gorgias' position, thus demonstrating and enhancing the difference between the art and sophistry. The primary distinction being that Plato can teach us rhetoric through his dialogues while a sophist, like Gorgias, could not.

In the penultimate discussion of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates and Phaedrus attempt to describe what the art of rhetoric must be like, if such an art exists. Socrates offers a strange and unique definition for the rhetorical art. "Well, then, isn't the rhetorical art, taken as a whole, a way of *directing* [my emphasis] the soul by means of speech... (261a)." Phaedrus exclaims his surprise at such a definition (261b) and so too are we stunned until it becomes clear what Socrates means.

Socrates admits, perhaps reluctantly, that it is not necessary to have an expertise about the subject one is attempting to be persuasive about. Because even if one did have the kind of knowledge that made one an expert, this very knowledge would remain idle in the speaker's voice and never active in the hearer's ears without an art of rhetoric to stimulate. In the hypothetical words of a personified *Rhetoric* Socrates mimics: "'But I do make this boast: even someone who knows the truth couldn't produce conviction on the basis of a systematic art without me [,Rhetoric] (*Phae.* 260d).'" Let us note for now that this line of reasoning that claims that experts of a subject are less capable of being persuasive about that subject than a rhetorician who has no expertise on the subject, comes dangerously close to Gorgias' own claim about rhetoric. Yet Gorgias, as we shall see, cannot substantiate his claim with a rational account that explains rhetoric's power of persuasion (*Gor.* 456b).

As shown above from the *Gorgias*, if there is an art of rhetoric, an art implies an expertise that must be constituted by some sort of knowledge. The knowledge would consist of an account and a regard for what is best or good.¹

To this I would add the crowning criterion: *an art must be teachable*.² Because the art of rhetoric is the directing of souls by means of speech, then the knowledge, composing expertise in rhetoric seems to be: knowledge of souls, how many kinds there are, their particular constitutions, and, in summary, a psychology; knowledge of speeches; and the types of speeches that correspond to various types of souls. “[A]nyone else who *teaches* [my emphasis] the art of rhetoric seriously will, first, describe the soul with absolute precision and enable us to understand what it is...And *he will give instructions* [my emphasis] concerning the reason why one kind of soul is necessarily convinced by one kind of speech while another necessarily remains unconvinced (*Phae.* 271a-b).” From this quote we see not only what an account of rhetoric would be like but also, from my emphases, the concern with being able to teach that account.

The account of rhetoric can be best described teleologically. An art must produce some good or something that is good, and because rhetoric's concern is the soul, thus the art of rhetoric must produce goodness within the soul. By definition we might argue that all arts must produce good things, otherwise we call the artist, who produces bad things, artless or no artist at all. If the doctor cannot produce health in bodies, then he does not practice the art of medicine; he is a quack. Likewise, if the rhetorician cannot produce virtue in the soul, he does not practice the rhetorical art; he is a mere sophist. “In both cases we need to determine the nature of something--of the body in medicine, of the soul in rhetoric. Otherwise...[w]e won't be able to supply, on the basis of an art, a body with medicines and diet that will make it healthy and strong, or a soul with the reasons...for conduct that will impart to it the conviction and virtues we want (*Phae.* 270b).” Aristotle makes this same comparison when he defines rhetoric. “[F]or it is not a function of medicine to create health but to promote this as much as possible; for it is nevertheless possible to treat well those who cannot recover health (*Rhetoric* I.1.14).” From this I would further qualify the end-purpose of rhetoric. Rhetoric promotes virtue within a soul in so far as that soul is capable of attaining virtue, and, therefore, knowing how much or how little virtue each type of soul will achieve is a part of the rhetorical art. The rhetorician must use his knowledge of souls and speeches and use it in a good way, that is, by using the sort of speeches that produce the appropriate amount of goodness within souls. And clearly, if we are knowledgeable about souls, we will then know what is best for them.

Lastly in order to come to a full definition of the art of rhetoric we will

use Gorgias' type of rhetoric as a foil. Above we had said that an art of rhetoric must be teachable, for if one had an account or knowledge about rhetoric, then one would be able to teach that knowledge. It was Gorgias' original claim that he could teach others to be rhetoricians (*Gor.* 449b); yet, as we shall see, it is this very claim that Socrates sets out to refute by showing Gorgias' account of rhetoric as confused and not learnable.

Much to the sophist's embarrassment, Socrates announces that he has found an inconsistency within Gorgias' account of rhetoric (*Gor.* 457e). Of course if one has an inconsistent account--that is uncertain knowledge--of rhetoric, then this cannot possibly be *the* art of rhetoric; but, what is Gorgias' inconsistency? Socrates in the course of the dialogue has persuaded Gorgias to agree that rhetoric is "a producer of conviction-persuasion and not teaching-persuasion concerning what's just and unjust (*Gor.* 455a)." The basis of distinction between the two types persuasion is knowledge: in the case of conviction-persuasion, the rhetorician persuades an audience to adopt a certain conviction or opinion not founded on knowledge; in the second case of teaching-persuasion, the expert or artist persuades through and imparts his knowledge (*Gor.* 454e). The consequence of such a distinction is that the sophist, who having no expertise on a particular subject, is capable of being more persuasive about that subject than an expert of that subject. "So when an orator is more persuasive than a doctor, a non-knower will be more persuasive than a knower...Oratory doesn't need to have any knowledge of the state of affairs of their subject matter; it only needs to have discovered a persuasion device...(Gor. 459b)." "Oh yes Socrates...Many a time I've gone with my brother or with other doctors to call on some sick person who refuses to take his medicine...And when the doctor failed to persuade him, I succeeded, by means of no other craft than oratory (*Gor.* 456b)."

Yet Gorgias has already said that a rhetorician should use rhetoric justly (*Gor.* 457b) and therefore if an aspiring student were to come to him who had no knowledge of what is just and unjust, he, Gorgias, would propose to teach him (*Gor.* 460a).

It is here, then, that Socrates arrests Gorgias, and by now we too should have seen the inconsistency. Gorgias has already admitted that rhetoric is concerned with the just and unjust, but that rhetoric practices only conviction-persuasion. This means that rhetoric, at least of the Gorgian variety, does not impart or even have knowledge about the just and unjust. Gorgias, however, urges that rhetoric should be employed justly. "He should use oratory justly,

as he would any competitive skill. And I suppose that if a person who has become an orator goes on with this ability and this craft to commit wrongdoing, we shouldn't hate his teacher...For while the teacher imparted it to be used justly, the pupil is making the opposite use of it (*Gor.* 457b-c)." But how can a rhetorician do what is just, more specifically, practice rhetoric justly, if the rhetorician has no knowledge of justice? Certainly it will not be Gorgias and his school of rhetoric that imparts such knowledge. "Is it the case that the orator is in the same position with respect to what's just and unjust...as he is about what is healthy and about the subjects of other crafts (*Gor.* 459d)?" On the basis of this inconsistency the answer is surely "Yes."

These conclusions, derived from the *Phaedrus* and *Gorgias*, are then the reasons why the art of rhetoric is not simply persuasion, but rather a *directing*³ of souls by means of those speeches that will cause a particular soul to love virtue. We might then characterize Socratic rhetoric as a psychology whereby each soul that Socrates encounters in dialogue he hopes to engage and turn as far as possible in the direction of the good and away from what is merely pleasant. Of course, the particular soul we want to engage next is that of Phaedrus.

Applying the Art of Rhetoric to Phaedrus' Soul

"Oh, my Phaedrus, if I don't know my Phaedrus I must be forgetting who I am myself--and neither is the case (*Phae.* 228a)." My proposed mission is to come by this knowledge, so that we too may know who he is or, at least, who Plato makes Phaedrus out to be. We lust after the constitution of Phaedrus' soul. We ask, what are the ruling elements or appetites of his soul? In answer to this psychological question we shall discover that Phaedrus is dominated by Eros. In particular, he is possessed by a love of speeches and an erotic proclivity for men. From this friendship we will gain the advantage of the dialogue itself and witness how Socrates, who possessing such a psychology, uses the art of rhetoric--and not just its usual form of words but also an embodied act that is conveyed *dramatically* by Plato--to charm Phaedrus and engender virtue within him.

First of all, Phaedrus is possessed by a love of speeches. From the start of the dialogue we learn that he has been in Lysias' presence all morning long, begging Lysias for a speech and the repetition of that speech. And as if this was not enough, Phaedrus has taken the written speech and intends to memorize it this very same afternoon (*Phae.* 228a-b). Further, in exchange for the ability to memorize the speech and recite it nobly, Phaedrus would trade a

large fortune (228a). Finally if it has not been made clear yet, Phaedrus considers the highest pleasures as having to do with speeches, their production and their being heard (258e). It is an understatement to suggest that Phaedrus has an *appetite* for speeches--especially those concerning erotica.

Turning to Plato's *Symposium*, we find that Phaedrus receives the honor of going first in the speech-contest of praising Eros, the reason being that giving such erotic speeches was his very own conception. Eryximachus narrates: "The tale I am about to tell is not my own but Phaedrus' here. On several occasions Phaedrus has said to me in annoyance, 'Isn't it awful, Eryximachus, that hymns and paeans have been made by poets for other gods, but for Eros, who is so great and important a god, not one of the many poets there have been has ever made an eulogy?...So they employ much zeal in things like that, yet to this day not one human being has dared to hymn Eros in a worthy manner; but so great a god lies in neglect....' Phaedrus should be first to begin, inasmuch as he is lying on the head couch and is also *the father of the argument* (*Sym.* 177a-e)."⁴

Phaedrus' eroticism extends far beyond speeches into the physical: whether he consummates it or not, as Plato presents him, Phaedrus has an appetite for men; he is, in other words, erotically inclined towards them. In his *Symposium* speech he accords the highest honor to Achilles and his manly virtues. "For Achilles they sent away to the Isles of the Blest, because, though he had learned from his mother that he would be killed if he killed Hector, and that if he did not, he would return home and die in old age, still he dared to choose to come to the aid of his lover Patroclus (179e)." Phaedrus reinterprets Achilles as the beloved who sacrificed himself for his lover Patroclus instead of the warrior whose *hybris*, or rage, lead him into his prophetic battle with Hector.

Instead of rage, Eros becomes the cause of Achilles' virtue and its rewards. Phaedrus' interpretation of Achilles' death as the shining example of Eros might lead one to suppose that he considers that the highest form of Eros is achieved between two men. This supposition would be confirmed by Phaedrus' opinion that a Spartan-like army of manly lovers would be the ultimate fighting force. "[W]ere they to battle alongside one another, then even a few of this sort would win over just about all *human beings*; for *real men* [Allan Bloom, in his essay *The Ladder of Love*, is correct to point out Phaedrus' emphasis here between mere humans (*anthropoi*) and real men (*andres*)] in love would of course far less prefer to be seen by his

beloved...when it comes to...throwing his weapons away (179a)." Phaedrus believes that the highest form of Eros is engendered between men and because eroticism and erotica dominates his soul--as shown by his love of erotic speeches--Phaedrus is, if not *in-deed* then at least in thought, attracted to men.

Socrates, our master rhetorician and thus by my account, master psychologist, already in possession of this knowledge, sets out to turn these appetites around and direct Phaedrus' soul in the direction of philosophy. "[A]nd that the part of our souls in which our appetites reside is actually the sort of thing open to persuasion and to shift back and forth (*Gor.* 493a)." Through the use of the rhetorical art, that is, knowing Phaedrus' soul and the kind of speeches it is susceptible to (namely the erotic kind), Socrates wishes to turn Phaedrus' love of speeches and men into a love of wisdom (*Phae.* Intro., pg.xli). "[B]lame it on Lysias, who was its father, and put a stop to his making speeches of this sort; convert him to philosophy like his brother Polemarchus so that his lover here [Phaedrus] may no longer play both sides as he does now, but simply devote his life to Love through philosophical discussions (*Phae.* 257b)." In summary then, that this procedure of divorcing Phaedrus from his primary appetites for the sake of philosophical endeavors is not unlike Diotima's crescendo found in the *Symposium* where she describes a progressive erotic movement away from the love of physical beauty and sophisticated speeches toward love of metaphysical beauty and philosophical speeches and thought (*Sym.* 210a-211b). Much like Hermes, who was the guide of lost souls, Socrates guides Phaedrus' voracious soul *as far as possible* into newfound lands of wisdom whereat satisfaction is possible.

Concluding our interpretative synopsis, we turn to the beginning of the *Phaedrus* where Socrates takes advantage of the young Phaedrus' erotic inclination toward men. The beginning of the dialogue serves to show us, the readers, Phaedrus' soul. As already shown above, we learn of Phaedrus' love of speeches by the fact that he has been in Lysias' possession all morning long; yet the afternoon will belong to Socrates as he attempts to coax Phaedrus out of Lysias' possession into his own. The beginning of the dialogue resembles a dramatic scene of seduction more than it does a philosophical discussion, as if Socrates and Phaedrus were two lovers, both searching for a secluded spot of nature wherein they can express their inner nature to each other. Consider the romantic nature of the dialogue from 229a to 230e. Speaking of the spot they eventually choose: "It's shady, with a light breeze; we can sit or, if we prefer, lie down on the grass there...The stream is

lovely, pure and clear: just right for girls to be playing nearby (229b),” and Socrates is an agreement, especially of laying down together: “The most exquisite thing of all, of course, is the grassy slope: it rises so gently that you can rest your head perfectly when you lie down on it (230c).” Dramatically this seductive prelude preys upon Phaedrus but philosophically, Plato is directing us, his readers, to observe that his characters are making their way out of the public realm, the city filled with its Areopagi and Assemblies, and entering the private realm, which is devoid of censure or *nomos*. And it is commonly held that the private realm is for lovers, so adequately expressed by the colloquial imperative against *public displays* of affection: “Get a room!”

Now we can consummate Socrates’ definition of the rhetorical art already quoted above, “...not only in the lawcourts and on other public occasion but also in private (*Phae.* 261a).” It is Socrates novel addition of the private realm that surprises Phaedrus the most (*Phae.* 261b). Phaedrus is hard-pressed to understand this addition for he cannot grasp why someone would give a beautifully crafted speech to only one other person, except as practice. And he can only conceive of the private realm, the countryside, being useful to rhetoric, in that it is a place to memorize those speeches that one would deliver in public, as this was his original intention. We, however, can understand this novel addition to the definition of rhetoric because the private realm is the most suitable for becoming intimate with a soul and then concentrating a speech upon that soul.

By interpreting the *Phaedrus* as a lesson in the application of the rhetorical art, it becomes easy to make sense of its primary parts: the seduction scene, the erotic speeches, and the discussions on rhetoric and writing. The seduction and the erotic speeches, and even the discussion on writing--as is Plato’s method to return to the originating circumstances of a dialogue with a new understanding--all serve to seduce Phaedrus’ soul away from the grip of Lysias and what he represents: a mere sophist. It must be noted that Lysias’ speech is presented as a written piece and thus as something to be read. Perhaps Plato’s hope was to distinguish his writing from that of other writers like Lysias.⁵ And of course the climax of the dialogue is the discussion on technical rhetoric, this being the height of Phaedrus’ erotic inclinations and the direction his soul ought to take once in Socrates’ possession. But, alas, it seems Phaedrus is not worthy enough for such a pursuit and views the rhetorical art as something impossible. “Still, it’s evidently rather a major undertaking,” and “What you’ve said is wonderful,

Socrates—if only it could be done!” (*Phae.* 272b, 274b). But any reader who becomes won over by Plato is proof enough that the rhetorical art is not a mere fantasy.

Concluding Remarks

With Socrates’ account of rhetoric finally at hand we are now able to show the distinguishing significance of the rhetorical art as opposed to its counterpart, dialectics. The true philosophical insights of Platonic philosophy originate not with dialectics; for dialectics function only as a precursor or foundation-builder for the rhetorical art. “The reason why they cannot define rhetoric is that they are ignorant of dialectic (*Phae.* 269b).” Let us practice caution and not mistake this and take this as meaning that dialectics and rhetoric are one and the same, for, as Phaedrus says: “[I]t seems to me that you are right in calling this sort of thing you mentioned dialectic; but, it seems to me, rhetoric still eludes us (*Phae.* 266c).” And what seemed to be eluding both Socrates and Phaedrus was the psychology and end that define rhetoric as opposed to dialectics which can achieve its end, *synthetic* truth, without regard for the soul(s) it may encounter. Platonic philosophy ought not to be characterized by a search for the synthetic Truth through dialectics, but rather as an education and edifying of *particular* souls which, of course, as we have seen, is the end-purpose of the rhetorical art.

What this means for a reader of Platonic philosophy is a heightened sense for the drama of Plato's dialogues. In interpreting the *Phaedrus*, I have employed many examples of the dramatic material that can be found within this dialogue; yet such drama takes place throughout every dialogue. It is important enough to mention the obvious here: Plato writes in the form of dialogue, thus *characters* i.e. particular souls, such as Socrates and Phaedrus, are presenting Plato's philosophy. I believe that one of Plato’s purposes in writing the dialogues is to show the various ways in which a teacher, Socrates, engages a particular student and endeavors to turn that student around upon himself. In turning arguments on their head, Socrates is forcing his interlocutors to examine their own positions and thus leading them to examine themselves. I would like to offer the theme of being thunder-struck or numbed by Socrates found in the dialogues as evidence of the immediate danger of introspection that Socrates’ dialectical method poses for these often unsuspecting students.

Yet Plato’s style suggests that there is more to engaging a student than mere dialectics. Plato presents the dialectical movement within the over-

arching structure of a *dramatic dialogue* (which is a redundancy of terms); each dialogue is built upon unique dramatic material. And I believe that the key to unlocking each dialogue is the establishment of a theory of Platonic rhetoric. For while it is certainly important to become knowledgeable about the dialectical argumentation (like I have done above in showing Gorgias' inconsistency), ultimately these arguments and how we, as readers, are to understand them and their conclusions are and should be influenced by the drama. Rhetoric is important not only in itself but also as an hermeneutical framework because, as Plato presents it in his *Phaedrus*, it involves a psychology and, as a reader, this is tantamount to becoming intimately familiar with the nature and motivations that characterize each character—just as one would do in analyzing a drama.

¹ I have taken a cue from Zeyl's note 4 which states: "(1) a *techne* is a rational enterprise... (2) a practitioner of *techne* aims to produce some good." But I differ from Zeyl in that from his criteria I derive the further criterion: that the artist must be capable of teaching his art, which is the overarching criterion that is not met by Gorgias.

² If we are to take seriously Socrates' hypothesis, as quoted above in the previous paragraph along with our understanding that an art of rhetoric is based on knowledge, we then must wonder how it is that one is taught the art in the first place. For if knowledge cannot be transmitted except through an art of rhetoric, then we need some sort of meta-rhetoric to gain the knowledge that constitutes the art. But this of course leads us into a regress. It is the very problem of teaching rhetoric that I believe concerns Plato in the *Phaedrus*. Yet he may be able to solve the problem by *dramatic presentation*, so that so long as we are receptive to the drama of the *Phaedrus* we will gain the knowledge of rhetoric and avoid the regress.

³ See note 137 of Nehamas and Woodruff: I believe, just as Nehamas and Woodruff do, that it is important to emphasize the fact that Plato uses the verb "soul-leading (*psychogogia*)" rather than the verb "persuasion". Perhaps he does this as a way to further distinguish rhetoric from what I name as sophistry.

⁴ I would like to note that this last bit of phrase, "father of the argument," also makes its appearance in the *Phaedrus*, in regards to Lysias, whose written speech, much like Phaedrus' in the *Symposium*, starts the eulogies of Eros within that dialogue (*Phae.* 257b). Perhaps the repeated use of this expression shows the connection between the two I will now hope to make.

⁵ Historically Lysias was a logographer, a professional writer of speeches for others, especially for the use in Athenian law courts. One would ask Lysias to write a *public* speech for their cause or case and then they would memorize it for presentation (Kennedy, appendix 1.C); just as Phaedrus had intended to do at the beginning of the drama.

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